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Abstract
As artificial intelligence plays an increasingly im-
portant role in our society, there are ethical and
moral obligations for both businesses and re-
searchers to ensure that their machine learning
models are designed, deployed, and maintained re-
sponsibly. These models need to be rigorously au-
dited for fairness, robustness, transparency, and in-
terpretability. A variety of methods have been de-
veloped that focus on these issues in isolation, how-
ever, managing these methods in conjunction with
model development can be cumbersome and time-
consuming. In this paper, we introduce a unified
and model-agnostic approach to address these is-
sues: Counterfactual Explanations for Robustness,
Transparency, Interpretability, and Fairness of Arti-
ficial Intelligence models (CERTIFAI). Unlike pre-
vious methods in this domain, CERTIFAI is a gen-
eral tool that can be applied to any black-box model
and any type of input data. Given a model and an
input instance, CERTIFAI uses a custom genetic
algorithm to generate counterfactuals1: instances
close to the input that change the prediction of the
model. We demonstrate how these counterfactuals
can be used to examine issues of robustness, inter-
pretability, transparency, and fairness. Addition-
ally, we introduce CERScore, the first black-box
model robustness score that performs comparably
to methods that have access to model internals.
1 Introduction
As the adoption of machine learning models to everyday tasks
grows rapidly, so does the need to consider the ethical, moral,
and social consequences of the decisions made by such mod-
els. Several important questions arise in a variety of appli-
cations, such as the following: 1) how did the model predict
1 Counterfactuals have a well-established meaning in the causal-
ity literature. However, we are using “counterfactual” in the coun-
terfactual explanation sense, one that has been recently initiated in
the explainability literature [Wachter et al., 2017] where the model
implies a machine learning model and not a causal model and hence
no causal assumptions are made here
Figure 1: The CERTIFAI counterfactual generation process. The
decision boundary for a binary classifier is shown, with the input
instance in black. We sample a set of points (left) in the feature space
with a constraint that they must lie on the other side of the decision
boundary (green points). The algorithm then evolves these samples
(middle) to generate individuals that lie closer to the input point but
on the other side of the decision boundary. Finally, a smaller set, the
size of which is user-defined, of counterfactuals is generated (right).
what it predicted?, 2) if a person got an unfavorable outcome
from the model, what can they do to change that?, 3) has the
model been unfair to a particular group?, and 4) how easily
can the model be fooled? Researchers are actively building
separate approaches to answer each of these questions.
One promising vein of research in explainability, first intro-
duced by [Wachter et al., 2017], is generating counterfactu-
als. Given an input data point and a black-box machine learn-
ing model (i.e. we only have access to the model’s prediction
for any input), a counterfactual is defined as a generated data
point that is as close to the input data point as possible but
for which the model gives a different outcome. For example,
if a user was denied a loan by a machine learning model, an
example counterfactual explanation could be: “Had your in-
come been $5000 greater per year and your credit score been
30 points higher, your loan would be approved.” [Wachter et
al., 2017] argue that counterfactuals are a way of explaining
model results to users such that they can identify actionable
ways of changing their behaviors to obtain favorable predic-
tions. In addition to providing counterfactuals for explain-
ability, we show how counterfactual explanations can be used
to audit fairness and robustness of a model.
As promising as the original method [Wachter et al., 2017]
and subsequent methods of generating counterfactuals [Ustun
et al., 2019; Russell, 2019] are, they are also limited in that
some only work for linear models, while others cannot deal
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CERTIFAI
[Ustun et al., 2019]
[Wachter et al., 2017]
[Russell, 2019]
[Ribeiro et al., 2016]
[Guidotti et al., 2018a]
[Carlini and Wagner, 2017]
[Weng et al., 2018]
Table 1: Comparison of related work with our approach. We consider the approach most similar to ours. Mixed-data means the method can
work with both discrete and continuous data, without any discretization or assumptions.
with different data types. To resolve these limitations, we
introduce CERTIFAI, a novel, flexible, model-agnostic tech-
nique for generating counterfactuals via a custom genetic al-
gorithm. The meta-heuristic evolutionary algorithm starts by
generating a random set of points such that they do not have
the same prediction as the input point. A subsequent evo-
lutionary process results in a set of points close to the input
that maintain the prediction constraint. Figure 1 shows an ex-
ample of three counterfactuals (green points) generated for a
given input (black point).
A major advantage of using the genetic algorithm to gen-
erate counterfactuals is that it can generate counterfactuals
for linear and non-linear models (e.g. deep networks) and
for any input form (from mixed tabular data to image data)
without any approximations to or assumptions for the model.
Moreover, end-users can 1) define a range for any feature,
and 2) restrict the features that can change. CERTIFAI sim-
ply constrains the values of the sampled points based on those
choices, allowing the generated counterfactuals to reflect a
user’s understanding of how much it is possible for them to
change their features.
CERTIFAI can be used to audit any black-box classifier,
providing three tools that are based on a single underlying
algorithm. The major contributions of this paper are summa-
rized as follows:
• Counterfactuals are generated using a custom genetic al-
gorithm, which is model-agnostic, flexible, and can be
used to provide explanations.
• Counterfactuals are shown to be effective adversarial ex-
amples. They are also used to generate the Counterfac-
tual Explanation-based robustness scores (CERScore),
which to the best of our knowledge is the first ever black-
box model robustness score.
• Counterfactuals can be used to evaluate fairness with re-
spect to a user’s input as well as the fairness of the model
towards groups of individuals.
2 Related Work
Table 1 summarizes the key features of CERTIFAI and the
work most related to CERTIFAI. Other general methods on
explainability, fairness and robustness have been described
by [Guidotti et al., 2018b],[Binns, 2017], and [Akhtar and
Mian, 2018] respectively. As we can see, there is no prior
art that handles a diverse set of desirable properties needed to
develop a responsible AI system. [Wachter et al., 2017] intro-
duced counterfactual explanations, however, their optimiza-
tion formulation cannot handle categorical data (i.e. the op-
timization does not solve for such data; the values are found
in a brute-force fashion). Methods in [Ustun et al., 2019]
and [Russell, 2019] only work for linear models. [Guidotti
et al., 2018a] uses a genetic algorithm to generate neighbors
around the input and then use decision trees to locally ap-
proximate the model. However, local approximations might
be at the cost of model accuracy, and they define counterfac-
tuals based on the minimum number of splits in the trained
decision tree, which might not always be the smallest change
to the input. The closest work to generating adversarial ex-
amples is by [Carlini and Wagner, 2017]. They work on a
white-box and simpler convolution models, and the distance
metrics might not be apt to measure image similarity. [Wang
et al., 2002]. [Weng et al., 2018] define a robustness score
CLEVER. However, they have access to the model gradients.
3 The CERTIFAI framework
In this section, we formulate a custom genetic algorithm to
find counterfactual(s). Consider a black-box classifier f and
an input instance x. Let the counterfactual be a feasible gen-
erated point c. Then the problem can be formulated as:
min
c
d(x, c)
s.t.f(c) 6= f(x)
(1)
where d(x, c) is the distance between x and c. To avoid using
any approximations to or assumptions for the model, we use
a genetic algorithm to solve Equation 1. The custom genetic
algorithm works for any black-box model and input data type,
and it is model-agnostic. Additionally, it provides a great deal
of flexibility in counterfactual generation.
CERTIFAI’s genetic algorithm solves the optimization
problem in Equation 1 through a process of natural selection.
The only mandatory inputs for the genetic algorithm are the
black-box classifier f and an input instance x. Generally, for
an n-dimensional input vector x, let W ∈ Rn represent the
space from which individuals can be generated and P be the
set of points with the same prediction as x:
P = {p|f(p) = f(x),p ∈W}. (2)
The possible set of individuals c ∈ I are defined such that
I =W \ P. (3)
Each individual c ∈ I is a candidate counterfactual. The goal
is to find the fittest possible c∗ to x constrained on c∗ ∈ I .
The fitness for an individual c is defined as:
fitness =
1
d(x, c)
. (4)
Here c∗ will then be the point closest to x such that c∗ ∈ I .
For a multi-class case, if a user wants the counterfactual c to
be belong to a particular class j, we define Q as:
Q = {q|f(q) = j,q ∈W}. (5)
Then Equation 3 becomes:
I = (W \ P ) ∩Q. (6)
The algorithm is carried out as follows: first, a set Ic is built
by randomly generating points such that they belong to I . In-
dividuals c ∈ Ic are then evolved through three processes:
selection, mutation, and crossovers. Selection chooses indi-
viduals that have the best fitness scores (Equation 4). A pro-
portion of these individuals (dependent on pm, the probability
of mutation) are then subjected to mutation, which involves
arbitrarily changing some feature values. A proportion of in-
dividuals (dependent on pc, the probability of crossover) are
then subjected to crossover, which involves randomly inter-
changing some feature values between individuals. The pop-
ulation is then restricted to the individuals that meet the re-
quired constraint (Equation 3 or Equation 6), and the fitness
scores of the new individuals are calculated. This is repeated
until the maximum number of generations is reached. Finally,
the individual(s) c∗ with the best fitness score(s) is/are chosen
as the desired counterfactual(s)2.
3.1 Choice of distance function
The choice of distance function used in Equation 1 depends
on the details provided by the model creator and the type of
data being considered. If the data is tabular, [Wachter et al.,
2017] demonstrated how the L1 norm normalized by the me-
dian absolute deviation (MAD) is better than using the L1
or L2 norm for counterfactual generation. For tabular data,
the L1 norm for continuous features (NormAbs) and a sim-
ple matching distance for categorical features (SimpMat) are
chosen as default. In the absence of training data, normaliza-
tion using MAD is not possible. However in model develop-
ment and our experimenets where there is access to training
data, normalization is possible. The distance metric used is:
d(x, c) =
ncon
n
NormAbs(x, c) +
ncat
n
SimpMat(x, c) (7)
where ncon and ncat are the number of continuous and cat-
egorical features, respectively, and n is the total number of
features (ncon + ncat = n).
2 pm=0.2 and pc=0.5, which is standard in literature. The pop-
ulation size is the square of the input feature size with a maximum
cap of 30,000. Grid-search is used to find the number of generations
For image data, the Euclidean distance and absolute dis-
tance between two images are not good measures of image
similarity [Wang et al., 2002]. Hence, we use SSIM (Struc-
tural Similarity Index Measure) [Wang et al., 2003], which
has been shown to be a better measure of what humans con-
sider to be similar images [Wang et al., 2002]. SSIM values
lie between 0 and 1, where a higher SSIM value means that
two images look more similar to each other. For the input
image x and counterfactual image c, the distance is:
d(x, c) =
1
SSIM(x, c)
. (8)
3.2 Improving counterfactuals with constraints
Apart from the input instance and black-box model, addi-
tional inputs help the algorithm produce better results. Aux-
iliary constraints are incorporated by restricting the space
defined by the set W : the space from which individuals
can be generated, to ensure feasible solutions. For an n-
dimensional input, let W be the Cartesian product of the
sets W1,W2,...,Wn. For continuous features, Wi can be con-
strained as Wi ∈ [Wimin,Wimax], and categorical features
can be constrained as Wi ∈ {W1,W2, ...,Wj}. However,
certain variables might be immutable (e.g., race). In these
cases, a feature i for an input x can be muted by setting
Wi = xi.
An example of the benefits of such constraints would be
when a user may not want an explanation of an income
change from $10,000 to $900,000 if that is not possible, so
Wi ∈ [$10000, $15000] might be an appropriate constraint.
The number of counterfactuals k can also be set. CERTI-
FAI chooses the top k individuals (k = 1 as default) where
different features have changed, so the end-user can get mul-
tiple diverse explanations of different kinds.
3.3 Robustness
Machine learning models are prone to attacks and threats.
For example, deep learning models have performed exceed-
ingly well for image recognition tasks, but it has been widely
shown [Carlini and Wagner, 2017], [Nguyen et al., 2015] that
these networks are prone to adversarial attacks. Two im-
ages may look the same to a human, but when presented to
a model, they can produce different outcomes. A counterfac-
tual is a generated point close to an input that changes the
prediction and is therefore an adversarial example.
Given two black-box models, if the counterfactuals across
classes are farther away from the input instances on average
for one network as compared to the other network, that net-
work would be harder to fool. Since CERTIFAI directly gives
a measure of distance d(x,c), this can be used to define the
robustness score for a classifier. Using this distance, we in-
troduce Counterfactual Explanation-based Robustness Score
(CERScore), the first ever black-box model robustness score.
Given a model, the CERScore is defined as the expected dis-
tance between the input instances and their corresponding
counterfactuals:
CERScore(model) = E
X
[d(x, c∗)]. (9)
To be able to better compare models trained on different
data sets, the CERScore can be normalized by the expected
value of the distance between data points in each class over all
classes k, and hence we get the normalized CERScore NCER-
Score (abbreviated as NC) as:
NC =
EX [d(x, c∗)].∑K
k=1 P (x ∈ classk)E[d(xi, xj);xi, xj ∈ classk]
(10)
(i.e., we normalize by dividing by the expected distance be-
tween two datapoints drawn from the same class). A higher
CERScore implies that the model is more robust. Note that
the normalized CERScore can be greater than 1. Unlike
[Weng et al., 2018], CERTIFAI only needs model predictions
and not the model internals.
3.4 Fairness
The fitness measure (Equation 4) and CERScore can also be
used to investigate fairness from individual and group per-
spectives, respectively. For a given individual instance, if the
genetic algorithm can generate different counterfactuals with
different values of a protected feature (e.g., race, age), and
as a result the user can achieve the desired outcome more
easily than when those features could not be changed, then
the individual could claim the model is unfair to their case.
Additionally, CERTIFAI can be used by model developers to
audit the fairness for different groups of observations. If the
fitness measure is markedly different for counterfactuals gen-
erated for the different partitions of a feature’s domain value,
this could be an indication the model is biased towards one
of the partitions. For example, if the gender feature is par-
titioned into two values (male and female), and the average
fitness values of generated counterfactuals are lower for fe-
males than for males, this could be used as evidence that the
model is not treating females fairly. Using counterfactuals
and the distance function, we can calculate the overall burden
for a group, measured as:
Burden(g) = E
g
[d(x, c∗)] (11)
where g is a partition defined by the distinct values for a spec-
ified feature set. Note, burden is related to CERScore as it
is the expected value over a group. Most fairness auditing
models focus on single features (e.g., [Hardt et al., 2016;
Donini et al., 2018]). Burden, however, does not have that
limitation and can be applied to any combination of features.
4 Experiments
We demonstrate the applications and flexibility of CERTI-
FAI to explainability, transparency, fairness, and robustness.
4.1 Robustness
In this section, we demonstrate how CERTIFAI produces ad-
versarial examples, and we use CERScore from Section 3.3
to measure a network’s resistance to adversarial attacks.
Generating Adersarial Examples
We consider the MNIST dataset [LeCun, 1998] which con-
tains 60000 (size 28x28) training images of digits. We use
Figure 2: Adversarial examples for the MNIST dataset. The im-
ages on the left are original inputs for which the model has a correct
prediction and the images on the right are counterfactual images (ad-
versarial examples) for which the prediction has changed.
Model CERScore CI CLEVER
Inception-v3 1.17 1.09-1.25 0.229
Resnet-50 1.06 1.05-1.08 0.137
MobileNet 1.08 1.06-1.09 0.151
Table 2: Robustness score and 95 percent confidence intervals (CI)
for those scores for 3 deep learning models and the corresponding
CLEVER scores
it to train a convolutional neural network, consisting of one
convolution layer, two dense layers, and intermediate pooling
and dropout layers. We achieve a 99.46% accuracy on the
test set using this architecture. Then we select random im-
ages from the MNIST dataset and the model above and find
the counterfactual image for each image, using SSIM (equa-
tion (8)). Every pixel is considered to be a feature and hence,
every individual in the population is a 784 dimension vector.
We use an initial population size of 30,000 individuals and
run the experiment for 1,000 generations.
Figure 2 shows an example of ten generated counterfactu-
als (right) and their original counterpart (left) images. The
counterfactual images on the right look nearly identical to
the input images on the left, however, the model predicts a
different outcome for the images on the left and right. The
imperceptibly different images give credence to the idea of
using a genetic algorithm formulation to produce counterfac-
tuals. Additionally, our approach towards generating these
images is model-agnostic and does not require any approxi-
mations, unlike [Carlini and Wagner, 2017]. The generated
images show how a network can easily be fooled and demon-
strate that there is a major problem in deploying such highly-
accurate networks to image-based decision making applica-
tions (eg. face recognition). Moreover, different kinds of
adversarial attacks can be generated by simply changing the
distance function in Equation 4.
Evaluating Deep Networks
In this section, we evaluate how well CERScore, introduced
in Section 3.3, can give an informative measure of robust-
ness. We consider the same networks as in [Weng et al.,
2018]: Inception-v3 [Szegedy et al., 2016] , ResNet-50 [He
et al., 2016] and MobileNet [Howard et al., 2017] pre-trained
Data set Num. Num. DT SVM MLP
obs. features NCERS. Acc. NCERS. Acc. NCERS. Acc.
Pima Diabetes 768 8 0.074 73.25 0.387 81.42 0.486 98.61
Breast Cancer 569 32 0.081 95.80 0.121 96.50 0.124 96.50
Iris 150 4 0.132 95.67 0.235 95.67 0.241 95.67
Table 3: Descriptions of data sets, and NCERScore (NCERS.) and test set accuracy (Acc.) for three models: decision tree (DT), SVM with
RBF kernel (SVM), and Multilayer Perceptron (MLP).
on ImageNet [Deng et al., 2009], where they define the
CLEVER score for robustness. Unlike CLEVER, we con-
sider the model to be a black-box (only relying on its predic-
tions). Ideally, to derive a measure of robustness for a model,
all images from all classes should be considered, their coun-
terfactuals should be generated, and the CERScore should
then be calculated. However, since the number of training
samples for a deep network is in the order of millions, it is
not computationally feasible to calculate the score for each
example. Hence, we consider a subset of classes and images
to calculate the CERScore. We sampled n=50 random images
from every class across k=100 random classes. We generate
the counterfactuals for all 5,000 images such that the counter-
factual gives a prediction of the second most likely class (by
generating individuals constrained on belonging to that class
as in Equation 6) and empirically estimate the CERScore as:
CERScore =
1
nk
k∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
d(xij , c∗ij) (12)
where xij is the jth input instance belonging to predicted
class i, and c∗ij is the corresponding counterfactual. The CER-
Scores are shown in Table ??. One way to interpret the score
is that on average, the SSIM score for Inception-v3 is 1/1.17
= 0.85, where an SSIM score of 1 means the images look
exactly the same and an SSIM score of 0 means the images
are highly different. Hence, adversarial attacks for Inception-
v3 could be more easily identified than for the other models.
We also show the 95% confidence interval where we have as-
sumed the distribution of distances between the images and
their counterfactuals follows a normal distribution. The con-
fidence intervals are tight around the CERScores.
We also compare CERScore with CLEVER scores [Weng
et al., 2018] for the same images, considering the top-2
class attack. The CLEVER scores are also reported in Ta-
ble ??. The CERScore implies that Inception-v3 is most ro-
bust and Resnet-50 is least robust, which is similar to what
the CLEVER scores suggest. Hence, even though CERTI-
FAI does not access any model weights, it is able to evaluate
a model’s robustness to adversarial attacks.
Robustness of Classic Classifiers
Next, we use NCERScore (Equation 10) to compare the ro-
bustness of different models trained on different data sets.
We train three models (decision trees (DT), Support Vector
Machines with RBF kernel (SVM), and multilayer percep-
trons (MLP)) on the three data sets listed in Table ??. We
report the NCERScore and the accuracy on the test set in Ta-
ble ??. Across all data sets, the neural network has the highest
Person Feature(s) Original Counterfactual
1 Glucose (CWC) 115 71
BMI (CUC) 35.3 10.1
2 Glucose (CWC) 168 89
Age (CUC) 34 44
Table 4: Counterfactual explanations for the Pima Indian diabetes
dataset. CWC: counterfactuals with constraints on feature values
and CUC: unconstrained counterfactuals. Unconstrained features
lead to infeasible solutions (BMI 10.1) or unchangeable features
(age) being changed.
NCERScore and is therefore the most robust of the classifiers
for these data sets. In the Pima diabetes data set, the accu-
racy of the decision tree is much lower than the other mod-
els, which suggests this simple model cannot adequately cap-
ture the class separation. Hence, more points would be con-
centrated near the decision boundaries, resulting in a lower
NCERScore.
For the Iris data set, while it is a relatively simple data set
(even the decision tree performs well), the decision tree has
the lowest NCERScore while the scores for SVM and MLP
are similar. In Figure 3, we plot input points for two fea-
tures of the Iris data set and the decision boundary for each
model. Looking closely, the points for the decision tree are
closer on average to the decision boundaries as compared to
the other two models (i.e. the densely clustered white and red
points are closer to decision boundaries), which suggests the
model is more prone to being fooled. The decision bound-
aries for both SVM and MLP are nearly identical around the
input points, which results in similar robustness scores. Sim-
ilar results can be seen for the cancer data set. Using these
results, a model developer can choose the most robust model
based on the NCERScore.
4.2 Explainability
Counterfactuals are used to provide explanations and trans-
parency to a user on how much change is needed for them to
obtain a favorable prediction. We show the importance of us-
ing the constraints to improve explanations, the use of multi-
ple counterfactual explanations for a single instance, and how
these can also be used to estimate feature importance.
Datasets and Models
We use the Pima Indian dataset [Smith et al., 1988] and the
UCI adult dataset [Kohavi, 1996] in the following experi-
ments. The Pima Indian dataset consists of 768 data samples
Figure 3: Decision boundaries and input points for the Iris flowers data set (3 classes) for 3 models: Neural Network, SVM with RBF kernel
and Decision tree (DT), visualized using two features from the data set. DT has closer points to the decision boundaries on average.
Person Feature(s) Original Counterfactual
1 Education 12th Bachelors
Occupation Tech-suppt Exec-managerial
1 Hrs-per-week 50 70
Workclass Local-gov Private
Table 5: Two explanations for the same person from the UCI adult
dataset, with constraints on feature values.
and 8 features where 6 features are continuous and integer-
valued, and 2 features are continuous float-valued. The task
is to predict the risk of diabetes (1: At risk, 0:Not at risk). We
train a 4 layer neural network with an input layer, 2 hidden
layers of 20 neurons each, and an output layer with a 80-20
training-test split. The accuracy of the model is 99.6% on the
test set. An initial population of 500 individuals is consid-
ered and the evaluation is done across 300 generations. The
UCI adult dataset consists of 48842 samples with 14 categor-
ical and continuous integer features and a binary outcome of
predicted income (>50k or <=50k). Since the dataset con-
tains many categorical variables, finding a counterfactual us-
ing [Wachter et al., 2017] would not be feasible. We train a
6 layer neural network with an input layer, 4 hidden layers of
80 neurons each, and an output layer with a 80-20 training-
test split. The accuracy of the model is 99.20% on the test
set. Since the dataset is larger, an initial random popula-
tion of 1000 individuals is considered and the evaluation is
done across 500 generations. The negative outcome is con-
sidered to be income <=50k, and we find the counterfactuals
for those. We only consider those input instances where the
model prediction matches the ground-truth.
Importance of Constraints
We consider two cases of counterfactual generation, counter-
factuals with constraints (CWC) and counterfactuals uncon-
strained (CUC) for users with a prediction of high diabetes
risk. CWC corresponds to a user or model creator providing
a range of values for features. CUC corresponds to a user
only providing the black-box model and the input instance
Figure 4: Feature importance for the model, trained on the Pima
Indian diabetes dataset, measured by the number of times a feature
changed to generate the counterfactual (left) and feature importance
by XGBoost (right).
without any constraints on the feature values. We show fea-
tures for which the values have changed (between the input
and counterfactual), all other values remained constant.
As shown in Table 4, for person 1, when we provide con-
straints (CWC), the explanation is: Had your glucose been
less by 34, you wouldn’t have been at the risk of diabetes. All
other feature values for the user remained constant. Without
constraints, the explanation shows that the BMI would have to
be decreased to 10.1. While this is a smaller change in mag-
nitude as compared to changing the glucose level, achieving
a BMI of 10.1 is not feasible, and hence it is important to use
the flexibility of our approach to add additional constraints
that ensure feasibility. Similarly, for person 2, the age is sug-
gested to be changed, which is not feasible.
Measuring feature importance
From a model developer’s perspective, counterfactuals can
show the importance of every feature value to the prediction
and hence provide transparency. If CERTIFAI is changing a
particular feature more often than another feature when com-
paring the input and counterfactual, that feature is more sig-
nificant for a model. For the Pima Indian diabetes dataset, we
Person Feature FitnessM FitnessU
1 Race 0.63 0.87
2 Gender 0.41 0.62
3 Race 0.81 0.81
Table 6: Fitness values when race and gender attributes are muted
(FitnessM) and unmuted (FitnessU) for three people.
generate counterfactuals for all samples (irrespective of pre-
diction) and analyze the number of times every feature value
has changed, as shown in Figure 4. Interestingly, the impor-
tances are qualitatively similar to those returned by Python’s
XGBoost [Chen and Guestrin, 2016] library (also shown in
Figure 4). Specifically, feature 5 (BMI) and feature 2 (Glu-
cose) are the most important in predicting diabetes risk. This
analysis can be extended to the multi-class case by constrain-
ing sampled individuals such that they belong to a desired
class (Equation 6)
Multiple counterfactual explanations
Multiple explanations are helpful to a user so that they can
receive a diverse set of changes that could be made to achieve
a desired outcome. The UCI adult dataset (CWC case) is con-
sidered and features such as native-country are muted and a
set range is given for features like hours-per-week. We run
the genetic algorithm for the input instance and select the best
two individuals that have different changes in feature indices.
The advantage of our approach is that we only need to run
the algorithm once, and we can generate many explanations,
as opposed to [Russell, 2019] where the IP solver needs to be
run multiple times to generate multiple explanations.
To underscore the benefits of suggesting alternative coun-
terfactuals, Table 5 shows two sets of explanations that are
generated by CERTIFAI for the same person. Multiple expla-
nations, the number of which is set by the user, allow a user
to decide which counterfactual may be the most actionable.
4.3 Fairness
We evaluate fairness from an individual’s perspective and
from a model developer’s perspective. To see if the model
is unfair towards any instance, we consider 100 random in-
stances of the UCI adult dataset where the prediction was un-
favorable and run the algorithm twice, once when the sensi-
tive attribute is not allowed to change and once when it is,
and record the fitness values. We do this for two sensitive
attributes, race and gender.
The results for three such instances are shown in Table 6.
FitnessM refers to the fitness value when the race feature
is muted for an individual and FitnessU corresponds to the
feature being unmuted. The fitness for the first 2 people
increases substantially when these protected features are al-
lowed to change and hence for these instances, there is evi-
dence that the model has not been fair. For the third person,
the evidence suggests that the model has been fair.
A model developer can use the idea of burden (Equa-
tion 11) to evaluate how fair a model is being to groups of
individuals. To demonstrate the idea of burden, we consider
Figure 5: Burden on different groups belonging to a particular race
in the UCI adult dataset, found using the distance between the input
instances and counterfactuals (Equation 11)
the attribute race in the UCI adult dataset and take all training
examples that have an unfavorable outcome. Results of our
experiments are shown in Figure 5. As we can see, the burden
on Black race and the Other race is more than the other races.
This means that on average, these groups would have to make
more changes to achieve a desired prediction as compared to
others. Hence the model imposes a burden on these groups,
which could imply that the model has been unfair.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we introduced CERTIFAI, a model-agnostic,
flexible, and user-friendly technique that helps build respon-
sible artificial intelligence systems. We demonstrate the flex-
ibility that the genetic algorithm brings to provide feasible
counterfacual explanations to a user. We show how individual
and group fairness can be measured using the fitness values
obtained during counterfactual generation. Finally, we show
how these counterfactuals are effective adversarial examples
and we define CERScore, the first ever measure of robustness
for a black-box model. We are currently developing the User-
Interface to CERTIFAI. Future work involves speeding up the
genetic algorithm by techniques like [Harik et al., 1999] and
[Mitchell et al., 1994] A comparison between the introduced
fairness metric and previous metrics would also be useful. It
would also be interesting to see how our adversarial examples
perform with strategies [Papernot et al., 2016], [Madry et al.,
2017] that are aimed to handle adversarial attacks.
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